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Abstract
We present a direct reduction from k-player games to 2-player games that preserves approximate
Nash equilibrium. Previously, the computational equivalence of computing approximate Nash equi-
librium in k-player and 2-player games was established via an indirect reduction. This included a
sequence of works defining the complexity class PPAD, identifying complete problems for this class,
showing that computing approximate Nash equilibrium for k-player games is in PPAD, and reducing
a PPAD-complete problem to computing approximate Nash equilibrium for 2-player games. Our di-
rect reduction makes no use of the concept of PPAD, thus eliminating some of the difficulties involved
in following the known indirect reduction.
1 Introduction
This manuscript addresses the computation of Nash equilibrium for games represented in normal form.
It is known that for 2-player games this problem is PPAD-complete [CD06b], and for k players it is in
PSPACE [EY07]. Moreover, for sufficiently small ǫ, computing ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium for
2-player games remains PPAD-complete [CDT06], and for k players it is in PPAD [DGP09]. It follows
that, for appropriate choices of ǫ, ǫ-well-supported Nash in k-player games reduces to ǫ-well-supported
Nash in 2-player games. However, this chain of reductions is indirect, passing through intermediate
notions other than games, and also rather complicated.
In this manuscript we present a direct, ”game theoretic” polynomial-time reduction from k-player to
2-player games. In our reduction, every pure strategy of each of the k players is represented by a
corresponding pure strategy of one of the 2 players. Previously, a direct reduction preserving exact
Nash equilibrium was known from k-player to 3-player games [Bub79]. Such a reduction cannot exist
to 2-player games due to issues of irrationality [Nas51], hence the need to consider the notion of ǫ-well-
supported Nash in this context. Our reduction guarantees that for appropriate choices of ǫ2 and ǫk,
given any ǫ2-well-supported Nash for the 2-player game, normalizing its probabilities according to the
above correspondence immediately gives an ǫk-well-supported Nash for the k-player game.
The direct reduction makes no use of the concept of PPAD. This eliminates some of the difficulties
involved in following the known indirect reduction. It is inevitable that unlike the indirect reduction,
our reduction by itself does not establish the PPAD-completeness of computing (or approximating) Nash
equilibria. Nevertheless, the new gadgets we introduce are relevant to the notion of PPAD-completeness,
as they can be used in other reductions among PPAD problems. Moreover, our reduction provides an
alternative proof to the proof of Daskalakis et al. [DGP09] that finding an approximate Nash equilibrium
in k-player games is in PPAD.
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holds the Lawrence G. Horowitz Professorial Chair at the Weizmann Institute.
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In the k-player case, the payoff of each player depends on the combined behavior of the other players.
We can thus view each player’s set of expected payoffs as a set of multiplicative functions in the other
players’ strategies. In a 2-player game, however, each player interacts with a single other player, and
so the expected payoffs are linear [vS07]. The described gap calls for ”linearization” of k-player games,
and indeed the first step of our reduction replaces the multilateral interactions among the k players
with bilateral interactions among pairs of players. In the next step, two representative ”super-players”
replace the multiple players, resulting in a 2-player game.
In terms of techniques, the first step of the reduction uses and extends the machinery of gadget games
developed by Goldberg and Papadimitriou [GP06]. We introduce a new gadget for performing approxi-
mate multiplication using linear operations, in order to bridge the gap between multiplicative and linear
games. The second step of the reduction uses similar methods to [GP06] and [MT09] in order to replace
multiple players by 2 players. The resulting 2-player game is a combination of a generalized Matching
Pennies game [GP06] and an imitation game [MT09].
1.1 Preliminaries
Let [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and ‖v‖ =∑i |vi|. For vectors u and v of length n, let u⊗ v denote their tensor
product written as a vector of length n2, where entry (i− 1)n+ j is uivj . We write x = y± z to denote
y − z ≤ x ≤ y + z. For vectors, x = y ± z denotes yi − z ≤ xi ≤ yi + z for every i.
Normal Form Games Players of a normal form game Gk are numbered from 1 to k. Unless stated
otherwise, every player has n pure strategies numbered from 1 to n. A pure strategy profile s is a vector
of length k in [n]× · · · × [n], containing one pure strategy per player. s−i is a pure strategy profile for
all players except i, obtained from s by removing the i’th entry. A payoff matrix M i =M iGk for player
i is of size n × nk−1. Unless stated otherwise, all entries are rationals in the [0, 1] range. M i[j, s−i]
is the payoff player i receives for playing pure strategy j against pure strategy profile s−i. A mixed
strategy pi for player i is a probability distribution over [n], denoting the probabilities with which i
plays her pure strategies. Its support is the set of pure strategies {j : pij > 0}. A mixed strategy profile
p = (p1, . . . ,pk) is a set of mixed strategies for every player, and p−i is a similar set for every player
except i. Let p˜ be the joint mixed strategy distribution, i.e. p˜ = p1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ pk. For every pure strategy
profile s, entry p˜[s] is the probability
∏
i p
i
si that every player i plays pure strategy si. Let p˜
−i be the
joint mixed strategy of all players except i. Given a mixed strategy profile p−i, the expected payoff
vector uiGk equals M
i
p˜
−i. The j’th entry uiGk [j] is the expected payoff player i receives for playing
pure strategy j while the others play p−i. Thus, the expected payoffs are algebraic functions in the
probabilities played by the others.
Polymatrix (Linear) Games In a polymatrix game, every player plays bilaterally against other
players, and receives the sum of payoffs obtained from these bilateral interactions. Thus, polymatrix
games are actually collections of 2-player games in which every player plays the same strategy in every
game she participates in. Players are numbered from 1 to m; player i has 2 ≤ ni ≤ n pure strategies and
m−1 rational payoff matrices M i,i′ of size ni×ni′ . Entry M i,i′ [j, j′] is the payoff to player i for playing
j against player i′ who plays j′. If players i, i′ do not interact or if their interaction is one-sided and
does not influence player i’s payoff, then M i,i
′
is set to be all-zeros. Given a pure strategy profile s−i,
the total payoff to player i for playing j is
∑
i′ 6=iM
i,i′ [j, s−i[i′]]. Given a mixed strategy profile p−i,
the expected payoff vector of player i is uiGm =
∑
i′ 6=iM
i,i′
p
i′ . Equivalently, if M iGm = (M
i,1 · · ·M i,m)
contains all the player’s payoff matrices as submatrices, then uiGm = M
i
Gm
p
−i. The expected payoffs
of a player are thus linear functions in the probabilities of the others. Unlike normal form games,
the size of polymatrix games is polynomial in n even when the number of players m is non-constant
(m = poly(n)).
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Nash Equilibrium, Approximations and Computational Problems A Nash equilibrium is a
mixed strategy profile such that the players of the game cannot improve their expected payoffs by
deviating from it unilaterally. The supports of a Nash equilibrium contain only pure strategies that
are best responses, i.e. maximize the expected payoff given the mixed strategies of the other players.
Formally, given a mixed strategy profile p−i, pure strategy j is a best response for player i if uiG[j] =
maxj′∈[n]{uiG[j′]}.
Every game has a Nash equilibrium [Nas51], but finding such an equilibrium may be difficult. There
are games for which every Nash equilibrium contains irrational probabilities, making it hard even to
represent. This motivates the consideration of approximate instead of exact Nash equilibrium. In
the context of reductions from k-player to 2-player games, there is another motivation for considering
approximate Nash equilibrium. Unlike k player games, 2-player games always have a rational Nash
equilibrium [Nas51, Pap07]. Thus we do not expect to find a reduction that preserves exact Nash
equilibrium, direct or indirect.
There are several possible notions of approximation. We focus on the notion of ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium, a mixed strategy profile whose supports contain only ǫ-best responses, i.e. pure strategies
that maximize the expected payoff up to an additive factor of ǫ. We will primarily be interested in
small, non-constant values of ǫ, namely ǫ = 1/poly(n) and ǫ = 1/ exp(n). A related, computationally
equivalent approximation notion is that of ǫ-Nash equilibrium - a mixed strategy profile from which
deviating unilaterally cannot improve a player’s expected payoff by more than ǫ [DGP09]. For other
approximation notions see [EY07].
Definition 1.1 (ǫk-kNASH and ǫm-LINEAR-NASH) Given a pair of normal form game Gk and
accuracy parameter ǫk, the problem ǫk-kNASH is to find an ǫk-well-supported Nash equilibrium of Gk.
Given a pair of polymatrix game Gm and accuracy parameter ǫm, the problem ǫm-LINEAR-NASH is to
find an ǫm-well-supported Nash equilibrium of Gm.
1.2 Our Results
Let (Gm1 , ǫm1), (Gm2 , ǫm2) be two pairs of games and accuracy parameters. The games have m1,m2
players respectively; the number of pure strategies of player i is n1i , n
2
i respectively. The following
definitions are based on the notion of reduction scheme defined by Bubelis [Bub79].
Definition 1.2 (Mapping between Games) A mapping from Gm1 to Gm2 includes:
• A function g : [m1]→ [m2] mapping players of Gm1 to players of Gm2 ;
• For every i ∈ [m1], an injective function hi : [n1i ]→ [n2g(i)] mapping pure strategies of player i to
distinct pure strategies of player g(i).
Definition 1.3 (Direct Reduction) A direct reduction from (Gm1 , ǫm1) to (Gm2 , ǫm2) is a mapping
from Gm1 to Gm2 , such that for every ǫm2-well-supported Nash equlibrium (q
1, . . . , qm2) of Gm2 , an
ǫm1-well-supported Nash equilibrium (p
1, . . . ,pm1) of Gm1 can be obtained by renormalizing probabilities
as follows: pi[j] = (1/z)qg(i)[hi(j)] (where z is a normalization factor).
Theorem 1.4 (Main) For every ǫk < 1, there exists a direct reduction from ǫk-kNASH to ǫ2-2NASH,
where ǫ2 = poly(ǫk/|Gk|). The reduction runs in polynomial time in |Gk| and in log(1/ǫk).
Corollary 1.5 There is a direct, polynomial time reduction from (1/ exp(n))-kNASH to (1/ exp(n))-
2NASH, and from (1/poly(n))-kNASH to (1/poly(n))-2NASH.
Proof of Theorem 1.4: By combining Theorem 3.1 (linearizing reduction) with Theorem 4.1 (reduc-
tion from linear to bimatrix games), and plugging in the parameters of Lemma 2.3 (logarithmic-sized
linear multiplication gadget). 
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For simplicitly of presentation we defer the proof of Lemma 2.3 to Section 5, and first prove in Section 2
a slightly weaker version (Lemma 2.2 - polynomial-sized linear multiplication gadget), resulting in a
reduction that runs in polynomial time in 1/ǫk instead of log(1/ǫk).
1.3 Related Work
Bubelis [Bub79] shows a direct reduction from k-player to 3-player games. This reduction relies heavily
on the multiplicative nature of 3-player games. Examples of direct reductions involving 2-player games
include symmetrization [GKT50], and reduction to imitation games [MT09]. We use imitation games
in Section 4.
PPAD-completeness results Papadimitriou introduced PPAD in 1991, motivated largely by the
challenge of classifying the Nash equilibrium problem [Pap94]. Formally, PPAD is the class of to-
tal search problems polynomial-time reducible to the abstract path-following problem END OF THE
LINE. Another important PPAD-complete problem is 3D-BROUWER, a discrete version of finding
Brouwer fixed-points in a 3-dimensional domain (the same problem in high-dimension is known as nD-
BROUWER). The known results can be summarized by the two following chains of reductions, each
forming an indirect reduction (according to Definition 1.3 of directness) from k-player games to 2-player
games:
• 1/ exp(n)-kNASH ≤ END OF THE LINE ≤ 3D-BROUWER ≤ ADDITIVE GRAPHICAL NASH
≤ 1/ exp(n)-2NASH
• 1/ exp(n)-kNASH ≤ END OF THE LINE ≤ 2D-BROUWER ≤ nD-BROUWER ≤ 1/poly(n)-
2NASH
The reductions in the first chain are by [vdLT82, DGP09], [Pap94, DGP09], [CD06b, DGP09] and
[DGP09], respectively. The reductions in the second chain are by [vdLT82, DGP09], [CD06a], [CDT06],
[CDT06], respectively. For an overview of these celebrated results see [Rou10]. In comparison, our
reduction can be written as:
• ǫk-kNASH ≤ ǫm-LINEAR-NASH ≤ ǫ2-2NASH
where ǫk, ǫm, ǫ2 can either be all 1/ exp(n) or all 1/poly(n). Note there is gap between the second chain
of reductions and our results - the second chain achieves a stronger reduction from 1/ exp(n)-kNASH to
1/poly(n)-2NASH. Achieving a direct version of this result by [CDT06] is an interesting open problem.
Note also that our reduction from ǫm-LINEAR-NASH to ǫ2-2NASH is somewhat similar to the reduction
from ADDITIVE GRAPHICAL NASH to 1/ exp(n)-2NASH, however our reduction does not require
the input game to be bipartite nor does it limit the number of interactions per player.
Another open question is the complexity of ǫk-kNASH and ǫ2-2NASH for constant values of ǫk, ǫ2. As
a quasi-polynomial algorithm is known [Alt94, LMM03], these problems are not believed to be PPAD-
complete. The current state-of-the-art is a polynomial-time algorithm for ǫ2-2NASH where ǫ2 ≈ 0.667
[KS10]. For finding ǫ2-Nash equilibrium rather than ǫ2-well-supported Nash equilibrium, there is an
algorithm where ǫ2 ≈ 0.339 [TS07] (see also [DMP06], [BBM07], [TS09]). On the negative side, several
algorithmic techniques have been ruled out [HK09], [DP09].
Reductions to 2-player games and linearization The empirical success of the Lemke-Howson
algorithm [LH64] for finding Nash equilibrium in 2-player games has motivated research on extending
it to a more general class of games. Daskalakis et al. show a general reduction from succinct games
to 2-player games, which can be applied to any game in which the expected payoffs can be calculated
using only +, ∗,max [DFP06]. Their reduction goes through the steps of the first chain of reductions
above. Govindan and Wilson present a non-polynomial linearizing reduction, which reduces multiplayer
games to polymatrix games while preserving approximate Nash equilibrium [GW10]. Their reduction
introduces a central coordinator player, who interacts bilaterally with every player while simulating the
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combined behavior of the other players.
In addition, linearization is also related to Etessami and Yannakakis’s formulation of PPAD as the class
of fixed-point problems for piecewise-linear functions (computable by +, scale,max) [EY07].
2 A Linear Multiplication Gadget
In this section we construct a linear multiplication gadget using standard gadgets as building blocks.
Theorem 2.1 (Linear Multiplication Gadget) There exist constants ǫ0 < 1, c, d and an increasing
polynomial function f such that the following holds. For every ǫ < ǫ0, there exists a linear multiplication
gadget G∗ = G∗(ǫ) of size O(m · f(1ǫ )), such that in an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, the output of
G∗ equals the product of its m inputs up to an additive error of ±dmǫc.
We develop two different constructions of G∗, with two different sets of parameters ǫ0, c, d, f .
Lemma 2.2 (Polynomial-Sized Construction) Theorem 2.1 holds with the following parameters:1
ǫ0 =
1
4 , c = 1, d = 19 and f(x) = x
2.
Lemma 2.3 (Logarithmic-Sized Construction) Theorem 2.1 holds with the following parameters:
ǫ0 =
1
105
, c = 12 , d = 3 and f(x) = log x.
The second construction gives a smaller gadget with size O(m log 1ǫ ) instead of O(
m
ǫ2
), but is more
complicated than the first construction. The rest of this section describes the first construction and
proves Lemma 2.2. Details of the second construction and the proof of Lemma 2.3 appear in Section 5.
2.1 Linear Gadgets
Goldberg and Papadimitriou developed the framework of gadgets [GP06], carefully-engineered games
that simulate arithmetic calculations and are useful in many PPAD-completeness results (see, e.g.,
[DGP09]). The players of a gadget game are typically binary, representing numerical values in the
range [0, 1].
Definition 2.4 (Binary Player) A binary player P is a player that has exactly two pure strategies 0
and 1. We say P represents the numerical value p ∈ [0, 1] if her mixed strategy is (1 − p, p), i.e. she
plays pure strategy 1 with probability p.
Gadget games have three kinds of binary players - one or more input players,2 one output player, and
one or more auxiliary players. The size of a gadget is the number of its auxiliary and output players.
The values represented by the input and output players are the input values and output value of the
gadget. In every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of the gadget game, the output value p is equal to
the result of an arithmetic operation on the input values (up to small error). This arithmetic relation
between the input and output values is the guarantee of the gadget. To achieve the guarantee, the
output player is incentivized to play the appropriate value p, by choosing appropriate payoff values for
both the output and auxiliary players. Our reductions require gadgets with linear guarantees, which
differ slightly from the graphical and additive-graphical gadgets used in previous works.
Definition 2.5 (Linear Gadgets) A linear gadget is a polymatrix gadget game with payoffs in [0, 1].
Linear gadgets simulate linear arithmetic operations, i.e. their guarantee is a linear relation between
the input and output values.
1The choice of d = 19 simplifies the proof, but it is not hard to show that for the same construction d can be replaced
with a smaller value.
2Gadgets can also have non-binary input players, in which case the value the input players represent is considered to
be the probability with which they play a certain predetermined pure strategy.
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Several gadgets can be combined into a single game, much like arithmetic gates are combined into
a circuit to carry out involved calculations. By setting the output player P of gadget G1 to be an
input player of gadget G2, the value p represented by P is shared among the gadgets. We represent a
combination of gadgets by a series of calculations on the input and output values. For example, if P ′ is
the output player of G2 representing the value p
′, then we write the above combination as p′ = G2(p)
(where in turn p = G1(. . . )). The following fact explains why the same player can be an input player
of multiple gadgets, but can only be the output player of a single gadget (as for auxliary players, they
are considered part of the inner implementation and are thus never shared among different gadgets). It
is a consequence of the gadget determining the payoff matrix of its output player, but not of its input
players.
Fact 2.6 (Combining Gadgets) For every game in which no player is the output player of more than
one gadget, the guarantees of all gadgets hold simultanuously when the game is in ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium.
2.1.1 Standard Gadgets
The following gadgets are constructed by Daskalakis et al. [DGP09]. To demonstrate the principle
behind their construction, we include here the proof of Lemma 2.7; proofs of Lemma 2.8 and Lemma 2.9
appear in Appendix A for completeness.
Lemma 2.7 (Linear Threshold Gadget) For every rational ζ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a linear gadget
G>ζ of size O(1) with input p1, such that in an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium the output is 1 if
p1 > ζ + ǫ and 0 if p1 < ζ − ǫ, and otherwise it may be any value in [0, 1].
Proof: Let P1, P be the input and output players of G>ζ representing values p1, p, respectively. We
set the payoff matrix MP,P1 to be:
MP,P1 =
(
ζ ζ
0 1
)
G>ζ has no auxiliary players, and so this concludes the construction. We now show that when G>ζ is in
ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, the guarantee of this gadget holds. Let p1 = (1 − p1, p1) be player
P1’s mixed strategy in the ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. The expected payoff vector u
P of player
P is equal to:
u
P =MP,P1p1 = (ζ, p1)
If p1 > ζ + ǫ, the only ǫ-best response for player P is pure strategy 1, so P ’s mixed strategy (1 − p, p)
in the ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium must be (0, 1) and thus p = 1. Similarly, if p1 < ζ − ǫ then
(1− p, p) = (1, 0) and thus p = 0. 
Lemma 2.8 (Linear AND Gadget) There exists a linear gadget G∧ of size O(1) with inputs p1, p2,
such that in an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ < 14 the output is 1 if p1 = p2 = 1 and 0 if
(p1 = 0) ∨ (p2 = 0), and otherwise it may be any value in [0, 1].
Lemma 2.9 (Linear Scaled-Summation Gadget) For every rational ζ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a linear
gadget G+,∗ζ of size O(1) with inputs p1, . . . , pm, such that in an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium the
output is min{ζ(p1 + · · ·+ pm), 1} ± ǫ.
In addition, there exist standard gadgets for multiplication, but these are inherently nonlinear - the
constructions are based on expected payoffs being multiplicative functions in players’ probabilities (see,
e.g., [DGP09]).
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2.2 Construction
Here we show the construction of G∗ that will be used to prove Lemma 2.2. We show a construction
for multiplying 2 inputs, and multiplying m inputs can be achieved by connecting m− 1 copies of this
construction serially. Let P1, P2 be the input players representing values p1, p2, and let P be the output
player representing value p. Let τ = 3ǫ (for simplicity assume that 1/τ is integer). We first encode
every input in unary representation, with precision of up to ±τ . For this we use 2/τ auxiliary players:
The vectors v1 = (v11 , . . . , v
1
1/τ ) and v
2 = (v21 , . . . , v
2
1/τ ) of values represented by auxiliary players {V 1i }
and {V 2i } are the unary encodings. The i’th unary bit of p1 is v1i , and it is calculated by the threshold
gadget G>ζ (Lemma 2.7) as follows: v
1
i = G>iτ (p1). Similarly, v
2
i = G>iτ (p2). Then we perform
unary multiplication using the AND gadget G∧ (Lemma 2.8). The result is a matrix U , which contains
1/τ2 values ui,j = G∧(v
1
i , v
2
j ), represented by auxiliary players {Ui,j}. The construction is complete by
summing up and scaling U ’s entries using the scaled-summation gadget G+,∗ζ (Lemma 2.9) as follows:
p = G+,∗τ2(u1,1, u1,2, . . . , u1/τ,1/τ ). This establishes the relation between the input values p1, p2 and the
output value p of G∗. Note that the payoffs of all players are determined by the standard gadgets.
2.3 Correctness
We prove Lemma 2.2 for the case m = 2. Namely, we show that for every ǫ < 1/4, when G∗ is in ǫ-well-
supported Nash equilibrium then p = p1p2 ± dǫ, that G∗ is linear and that the size of G∗ is O(1/ǫ2).
The proof of Lemma 2.2 for general m follows, since concatenating m − 1 copies of G∗ increases the
error and gadget size by a multiplicative factor of m.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 (Polynomial-Sized Construction): First note that G∗ is a combination of
linear gadgets and is thus itself linear. The size of G∗ is O(1/τ
2), the total size of the standard gadgets
(2/τ threshold gadgets G>ζ , 1/τ
2 AND gadgets G∧, and 1 scaled-summation gadget G+,∗ζ , all of size
O(1)).
We assume G∗ is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ < 1/4, and write the input values p1, p2
as integer multiples of τ plus a small error: let p1 = i
∗τ + δ1 and p2 = j
∗τ + δ2, where 0 ≤ i∗, j∗ ≤ 1/τ
and 0 ≤ δ1, δ2 < τ . The following claim shows that the coefficients i∗, j∗ are correctly encoded as
unary vectors v1,v2, and is a direct consequence of the threshold gadget’s guarantee (Lemma 2.7). The
threshold gadget is ”brittle” in the sense that for a small range of inputs it returns an arbitrary output,
but the choice of τ = 3ǫ ensures this happens for at most one unary bit.
Claim 2.10 (Unary Encoding) v1 is of the form (1, . . . , 1, ?, 0, . . . , 0), where ‖v1‖ = i∗ ± 1 and ’?’
denotes any value in [0, 1]. The same holds for v2 and j∗.
Proof: Consider the i’th entry of v1. By construction, v1i = G>iτ (p1). By Lemma 2.7, v
1
i indicates
whether p1 > iτ + ǫ or p1 < iτ − ǫ, and otherwise can be any value in [0, 1]. Since τ = 3ǫ we know that
p1 > (i
∗ − 1)τ + ǫ, therefore for every i ≤ i∗ − 1 entry v1i is equal to 1, and in total ‖v1‖ ≥ i∗ − 1. On
the other hand we know that p1 < (i
∗ + 2)− ǫ, therefore for every i ≥ i∗ + 2 entry v1i is equal to 0, and
in total ‖v1‖ ≤ i∗+1. Moreover, since τ > 2ǫ, there can be at most one value of i for which p1 = iτ ± ǫ,
and so there can be at most one entry i of v1 which is an arbitrary value ’?’ in [0, 1]. 
The rest of the proof of Lemma 2.2 is a straightforward corollary of the other gadget guarantees. Let
‖U‖ denote the sum∑i,j ui,j of matrix U ’s entries. By construction, p = G+,∗τ2(u1,1, u1,2, . . . , u1/τ,1/τ ),
thus by the guarantee of gadget G+,∗ζ (Lemma 2.9), p = τ
2‖U‖ ± ǫ. We write the product p1p2 as an
integer multiple of τ2 up to a small error: i∗j∗τ2 ≤ p1p2 < i∗j∗τ2+3τ . The next claim shows that ‖U‖
gives approximately the correct coefficient of τ2.
Claim 2.11 (i∗ − 1)(j∗ − 1) ≤ ‖U‖ ≤ (i∗ + 1)(j∗ + 1)
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Proof: Consider the (i, j)’th entry of U . By construction, ui,j = G∧(v
1
i , v
2
j ). By Lemma 2.8, if ǫ < 1/4
and v1i = v
2
j = 1 then ui,j = 1. By Claim 2.10, there are at least (i
∗ − 1)(j∗ − 1) pairs i, j such that
v1i = v
2
j = 1, and so ‖U‖ ≥ (i∗ − 1)(j∗ − 1). Similarly, by Lemma 2.8, if ǫ < 1/4 and v1i = 0 ∨ v2j = 0
then ui,j = 0. By Claim 2.10, there are at most (i
∗+1)(j∗ +1) pairs i, j such that v1i 6= 0∧ v2j 6= 0, and
so ‖U‖ ≤ (i∗ + 1)(j∗ + 1). 
Since i∗, j∗ ≤ 1/τ , it follows from the above claim that ‖U‖ = i∗j∗±(2/τ+1). So p = τ2i∗j∗±(3τ+ǫ) =
p1p2 ± (6τ + ǫ) = p1p2 ± dǫ, where d = 19. This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.2, showing that G∗
outputs the product of its inputs p1p2 up to a small error of ±dǫ. 
Example 2.12 Let p1 = 7τ + ǫ/4 and p2 = 2τ + (τ − ǫ/8). First we find the unary encoding: v1 =
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, ?, 0, . . . , 0) and v2 = (1, 1, ?, 0, . . . , 0). Then we perform unary multiplication:
U ′ =


1 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

 , U =
(
U ′ 0
0 0
)
1/τ×1/τ
Summing up and scaling the entries of U we get p = 12τ2 +O(ǫ), which is close to p1p2 up to O(ǫ).
3 Linearizing Multiplayer Games
In this section we show a direct reduction from k-player games to polymatrix games. Let Gk denote the
input game to the reduction, and let Gm denote the corresponding output game. The reduction relies on
the fact that, although Gk’s expected payoffs are nonlinear in its players’ probabilities, they are linear
in products of its players’ probabilities. A key component of our reduction is a linear multiplication
gadget for computing these products, which exists according to Theorem 2.1. Let f be an increasing
polynomial function as in Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.1 (A Linearizing Reduction) For every ǫk < 1, there exists a direct reduction from
ǫk-kNASH to ǫm-LINEAR-NASH, where ǫm = poly(ǫk/|Gk|). The reduction runs in polynomial time in
|Gk| and in f(1/ǫk).
Lemma 3.2 (Recovering ǫk-Well-Supported Nash) Let (p
1, . . . ,pm) be an ǫm-well-supported Nash
equilibrium of Gm. Then the first k mixed strategies p
1, . . . ,pk form an ǫk-well-supported Nash equilib-
rium of Gk.
3.1 Preserving Expected Payoffs
The following lemma will be useful in desiging the linearizing reduction. Let Gk be a game with k
players, n pure strategies each. Let Gm be a game with m > k players, where the first k players have
the same pure strategies as the players of Gk. Let (p
1, . . . ,pk), (p1, . . . ,pm) be mixed strategy profiles
of Gk, Gm.
Lemma 3.3 (Almost Equal Expected Payoffs) If for every player 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the expected payoff
vectors uiGm and u
i
Gk
are entry-wise equal up to an additive factor of δ, and (p1, . . . ,pm) is an ǫm-
well-supported Nash equilibrium of Gm, then (p
1, . . . ,pk) is an ǫk-well-supported Nash equilibrium of
Gk where ǫk = 2δ + ǫm.
Proof: Let j ∈ [n] be a pure strategy in the support of player i (pij > 0). We know that j is an ǫm-best
response in Gm. Assume for contradiction that j is not an ǫk-best response in Gk, i.e. there is a pure
strategy j′ ∈ [n], j′ 6= j such that uiGk(j′) > uiGk(j) + ǫk. So uiGm(j′) + δ > uiGm(j) − δ + ǫk. Since
ǫk − 2δ = ǫm, then uiGm(j′) > uiGm(j) + ǫm, contradiction. 
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Figure 1: Linearization of a 3-Player Game - Partial View of Gm
The arrows indicate how the probabilities of original players 1 and 2 influence the expected payoff of
original player 3 via a layer of gadgets and mediator players.
3.2 The Linearizing Reduction
Given an input pair (Gk, ǫk), we find an output pair (Gm, ǫm) as follows. Let ǫ0 < 1, c, d be the constant
parameters of Theorem 2.1. Then ǫm = min{(ǫk/3nk−1dk)1/c, ǫ0}. The players of Gm are:
• Original players - the first k players of Gm have the same pure strategies as Gk’s players. pi
denotes the mixed strategy of original player i.
• Mediator players - for every i ∈ [k], there is a set of nk−1 binary players that corresponds to the
set of nk−1 pure strategy profiles of all original players except i. We denote by Qs−i the mediator
player corresponding to pure strategy profile s−i and by qs−i the represented value.
• Gadget players - all auxiliary players belonging to knk−1 copies of the linear multiplication gadget
G∗.
Every mediator player is set to be the output player of a gadget G∗ as follows: qs−i = G∗(p
1
s−i[1]
, . . . , pk
s−i[k]
).
Thus, qs−i will be approximately equal to the probability with which the original players play the pure
strategy profile s−i. Let qi be the vector of values {qs−i}, then it’s approximately equal to p˜−i, the
joint mixed strategy distribution of all original players except i.
To complete the description of Gm it remains to specify the non-zero payoff matrices of the original
players (all other payoffs are determined by the gadgets). In Gk, the expected payoff vector of player
i is uiGk = M
i
Gk
p˜
−i. In Gm, the payoff of original player i will be influenced only by the i’th set of
mediator players {Qs−i} who play qi. Instead of describing every payoff matrix M i,Qs−i separately,
(such a description appears in the proof of Lemma 3.2), we describe one large payoff matrix M iGm that
contains all the others (or more precisely, all their nonzero columns) as submatrices. We want the
expected payoffs in Gm to be as close as possible to those of Gk. Thus, we set M
i
Gm
= M iGk . This
concludes the contruction.
3.3 Correctness
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (A Linearizing Reduction): The reduction runs in time polynomial in
|Gk| = Θ(knk) and in f(1/ǫk): The running time depends on the size of the polymatrix game Gm,
which is polynomial in the number of its players. There are k original players, knk−1 mediator players
and knk−1O(|G∗|) auxiliary players. By Theorem 2.1, |G∗| = O(k · f(1/ǫm)). Since f is a polynomial
function and ǫm = poly(ǫk/|Gk|), the total number of players is indeed polynomial in |Gk| and in
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f(1/ǫk). The rest of the proof follows from Lemma 3.2. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2 (Recovering ǫk-Well-supported Nash after Linearization): Let (p
1, . . . ,pm)
be an ǫm-well-supported Nash equilibrium of Gm. We show that the first k mixed strategies of
(p1, . . . ,pm) form an ǫk-well-supported Nash equilibrium of Gk. We would like to upper bound the
entry-wise distance between the payoff vectors uiGm , u
i
Gk
so that we can apply Lemma 3.3. The proof
proceeds as follows: We show that the expected payoff vector of original player i in Gm is u
i
Gm
=M iGmq
i.
Then we observe that the linear multiplication gadget G∗ guarantees that vectors q
i and p˜−i are close
to each other, and recall that M iGm =M
i
Gk
. Since all payoffs are in [0, 1], we conclude that the expected
payoffs uiGk =M
i
Gk
p˜
−i are preserved in Gm. The proof of Lemma 3.2 is then immediate by preservation
of expected payoffs (Lemma 3.3).
We start by an alternative, more formal description of the original players’ payoff matrices in Gm.
Consider the payoff matrix M i,Qs−i , corresponding to the interaction between original player i and
mediator Qs−i . Since Qs−i is a binary player with pure strategies {0, 1}, the size of M i,Qs−i is n × 2.
For every j ∈ [n] we set M i,Qs−i [j, 1] = M iGk [j, s−i] (where M iGk is the payoff matrix of player i in
game Gk), and M
i,Q
s−i [j, 0] = 0. So the column M i,Qs−i [·, 0] corresponding to the mediator’s pure
strategy 0 is all-zeros. The payoff matrix M iGm was defined above to contain all nonzero columns of
payoff matrices M i,Qs−i , i.e., all columns M i,Qs−i [·, 1]. It is now not hard to verify that M iGm = M iGk ,
and so the alternative description is equivalent to the original one.
Claim 3.4 (Expected Payoffs Vector) For every i ∈ [k], the expected payoff vector of original player
i in game Gm is u
i
Gm
=M iGmq
i.
Proof: uiGm is equal to the sum of expected payoff vectors of original player i from playing bilaterally
against every mediator player in {Qs−i}. Each expected payoff vector is a product of the payoff matrix
M i,Qs−i with vector pQs−i = (1− qs−i , qs−i) (the mixed strategy played by the binary mediator player
Qs−i). By construction of M
i,Q
s−i , the expected payoff vector is equal to the product of column vector
M i,Qs−i [·, 1] with scalar qs−i . Therefore, the sum of expected payoff vectors over all mediators is equal
to M iGmq
i. 
We now show that qi and p˜−i are almost equal. Consider entry qs−i of q
i. By construction, qs−i =
G∗(p
1
s−i[1]
, . . . , pk
s−i[k]
). By Theorem 2.1 and since ǫm < ǫ0, the gadget G∗ guarantees that qs−i =∏
i′ 6=i p
i′
s−i[i′]
± dk(ǫm)c. By definition of p˜−i as the joint mixed strategy distribution of all players
except i we get that qs−i = p˜
−i[s−i]± dk(ǫm)c. Thus, qi = p˜−i ± dk(ǫm)c.
Using the fact that the entries of M iGm ,M
i
Gk
are all in the range [0, 1], and that the dimensions of
the matrices are n × nk−1, we conclude that M iGmqi = M iGk p˜−i ± nk−1dk(ǫm)
c. We can now apply
Lemma 3.3 with δ = nk−1dk(ǫm)
c. So (p1, . . . ,pk) is a (2δ + ǫm)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of
Gk, and plugging in the chosen value of ǫm gives ǫk-well-supported Nash equilibrium, as required. 
4 Reducing Linear Games to Bimatrix Games
In this section we show how to replace the multiple players of a polymatrix game by two representative
”super-players” of a bimatrix game. Let Gm denote the input game to the reduction, and let G2 denote
the corresponding output game.
Theorem 4.1 (Linear to Bimatrix) For every ǫm < 1, there exists a direct reduction from ǫm-
LINEAR-NASH to ǫ2-2NASH, where ǫ2 = poly(ǫm/|Gm|). The reduction runs in polynomial time
in |Gm| and in log(1/ǫm).
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Lemma 4.2 (Recovering ǫm-Well-Supported Nash) For every ǫ2-well-supported Nash equilibrium
(x,y) of G2, partitioning y into subvectors y
1, . . . ,ym of lengths n1, . . . , nm and normalizing gives an
ǫm-well-supported Nash equilibrium (y
1/‖y1‖, . . . , ym/‖ym‖) of Gm.
4.1 Imitation Games and Block ǫ-Uniform Games
The following definitions and lemmas will be useful in proving Theorem 4.1. An imitation game is a
bimatrix game in which both players have N pure strategies, and the payoff matrix of player 2 is equal
to the N × N identity matrix IN . We call player 1 the leader and player 2 the imitator. A similar
lemma to the following was proved in [MT09] for the case of exact Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4.3 (Imitation) Let (x,y) be an ǫ2-well-supported Nash equilibrium of an imitation game G2
where ǫ2 ≤ 1/N . Then support(y) ⊆ support(x).
Proof: Assume pure strategy j is not in support(x), i.e. xj = 0. The expected payoff vector of the
imitator is u2G2 = INx = x, and so for pure strategy j the expected payoff is xj = 0. Since x is a
probability distribution vector with N entries of which one is assumed to be zero, there exists a pure
strategy j′ 6= j for which the imitator’s expected payoff is u2G2 [j′] = xj′ ≥ 1/(N −1) > ǫ. The difference
between the expected payoffs is more than ǫ, so j cannot be an ǫ-best response for the imitator and so
does not belong to support(y). We conclude that support(y) ⊆ support(x), as required. 
We call a bimatrix game block ǫ-uniform if player 1’s payoff matrix A is of the following form:
• Block matrix: A is composed of m2 blocks, where block (i, i′), denoted Ai,i′ , is of size ni × ni′ ;
• Very negative diagonal: The i’th diagonal block Ai,i is equal to −αEni , where α = 8m2/ǫ and Eni
is the all-ones matrix of size ni × ni;
• [0, 1] entries: All other entries of A are arbitrary values in the range [0, 1].
For a similar construction see the generalized Matching Pennies game of [GP06]. If x,y is a mixed
strategy profile of an ǫ-block-uniform game, we denote by x1, . . . ,xm and y1, . . . ,ym the mixed strategy
blocks of size n1, . . . , nm. We say that block i belongs to the support of mixed strategy x if there is
some pure strategy in block i that belongs to this support. The following lemma shows that in a block
ǫ-uniform game, the weight of player 2 is ǫ-uniformly divided among all blocks i in support(x).
Lemma 4.4 (ǫ-Uniform Weight Distribution) Let x,y be an ǫ2-well-supported Nash equilibrium
of a block ǫ2-uniform game G2. If block i ∈ [m] belongs to the support of x, then for every i′ ∈ [m],
‖yi‖ ≤ ‖yi′‖+ (1 + ǫ2)/α.
Proof: The expected payoff vector u1G2 of player 1 is Ay. By construction of matrix A, the expected
payoff vector for playing pure strategies in block i is
∑
i′∈[m]A
i,i′
y
i′ . The domininant vector in this
sum is Ai,iyi, whose entries are all −α‖yi‖. The entries of every other vector Ai,i′yi′ in the sum are
in the range [0, ‖yi′‖], and since y is a distribution vector, the total contribution to the sum is at most∑
i′∈[m] ‖yi
′‖ = 1. Thus, the expected payoff for playing any pure strategy in block i is in the range
[−α‖yi‖,−α‖yi‖ + 1]. Assume for contradiction that ‖yi‖ > ‖yi′‖ + (1 + ǫ2)/α. Then the expected
payoff for playing a pure strategy in block i is at most −α(‖yi′‖+ (1 + ǫ2)/α) + 1, while the expected
payoff for playing in block i′ is at least −α(‖yi′‖). The difference is more than ǫ2, contradicting the
assumption that i belongs to support(x). 
If a game is both imitation and block ǫ-uniform, then the weight of player 2 is divided ǫ-uniformly
among all blocks in [m].
Corollary 4.5 (Imitation and Block ǫ-Uniform) Let x,y be an ǫ2-well-supported Nash equilibrium
of a block ǫ2-uniform imitation game G2, where ǫ2 ≤ 1/N . Then for every two blocks i, i′ ∈ [m],
‖yi‖ = ‖yi′‖ ± (1 + ǫ2)/α.
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Proof: Since y is a distribution vector, there exists a block i ∈ [m] such that ‖yi‖ ≥ 1/m. So i
belongs to the support of y, and by Lemma 4.3, i also belongs to the support of x. By Lemma 4.4,
1/m ≤ ‖yi‖ ≤ ‖yi′‖+(1+ ǫ2)/α for every i′ ∈ [m]. Since (1+ ǫ2)/α < 1/m we conclude that 0 < ‖yi′‖
for every i′. Thus by Lemma 4.3 all blocks are in support(x) and get almost uniform weight. 
4.2 The Reduction
Given an input pair (Gm, ǫm), we show how to find an output pair (G2, ǫ2), where G2 has payoffs in the
range [−α, 1]. To complete the reduction, G2 can then be normalized by adding α to all payoffs and
scaling by 1/(α+1) (ǫ2 is also scaled). Let N =
∑m
i=1 ni be the total number of pure strategies in Gm.
Let ǫ2 = ǫm/N . The pure strategies of every player in G2 are the set [N ]. The payoffs are chosen such
that G2 is both an imitation game and a block ǫ2-uniform game:
A =


−αEn1 M1,2 · · · M1,m
M2,1 −αEn2 M2,m
...
. . .
...
Mm,1 Mm,2 · · · −αEnm


N×N
, B =


In1 0 · · · 0
0 In2 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · Inm


N×N
where M i,i
′
is the payoff matrix of player i for interacting with player i′ in Gm.
4.3 Correctness
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (Linear to Bimatrix): First note that the reduction runs in time polynomial
in |Gm| = Θ(N2) and in log(1/ǫm): The running time depends on the size of the bimatrix game G2,
whose payoff matrices are of size N2 with entries of size O(logα). It’s enough to prove Lemma 4.2 for
the unnormalized game G2 and ǫ2 = ǫm/N ; this immediately gives a proof for ǫ2 = ǫm/N(α + 1) after
normalizing the payoffs from [−α, 1] to [0, 1].3 Since ǫm/N(α+ 1) = poly(ǫm/N), Theorem 4.1 follows.

Proof of Lemma 4.2 (Recovering ǫm-Well-supported Nash from Bimatrix Game): Let (x,y)
be an ǫ2-well-supported Nash equilibrium played in G2, and let (y
1/‖y1‖, . . . , ym/‖ym‖) be a mixed
strategy profile played in Gm. We show that this mixed strategy profile is actually an ǫm-well-supported
Nash equilibrium of Gm.
For every player i of Gm, we define an injective function hi : [ni] → [N ] to be hi(j) =
∑
i′<i ni′ + j.
So hi maps the j’th pure strategy of player i in Gm to the j’th pure strategy in block i of player 1 in
G2. We now show that player i’s expected payoff for playing j in Gm is closely related to player 1’s
expected payoff for playing hi(j) in G2, assuming strategy profiles (x,y) and (y
1/‖y1‖, . . . , ym/‖ym‖)
are being played in G2 and Gm, respectively. In fact, the expected payoffs are the same up to shifting
by α‖yi‖ (the contribution from the diagonal of player 1’s payoff matrix A), scaling by m (the number
of blocks on which y is uniformly distributed), and small additive errors. As in Section 3, the fact that
the expected payoffs are preserved, even up to shift and scale, is enough for one game’s ǫ-well-supported
Nash equilibrium to imply the other’s.
Claim 4.6 (Expected Payoffs are Preserved up to Shift and Scale) uiGm [j] = m·(u1G2 [hi(j)]+
α‖yi‖)±m2(1 + ǫ2)/α.
Proof: By construction of matrix A, player 1’s expected payoff vector for playing pure strategies in block
i is Ai,iyi +
∑
i′ 6=iM
i,i′
y
i′ . The entries of vector Ai,iyi are −α‖yi‖, and the sum ∑i′ 6=iM i,i′yi′ equals
3Note that every ǫm/N(α + 1)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of the normalized game is an ǫm/N-well-supported
Nash equilibrium of the unnormalized game.
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‖yi′‖ ·∑i′ 6=iM i,i′yi′/‖yi′‖ = ‖yi′‖ · uiGm . By Corollary 4.5, and since (x,y) in an ǫ2-well-supported
Nash equilibrium of G2, player 2’s weight is distributed evenly over the m blocks up to (1+ ǫ2)/α. It is
not hard to see that Corollary 4.5 implies, for every i′ ∈ [m], that ‖yi′‖ = 1/m±(1+ǫ2)/α. Plugging in,
we get that entry hi(j) in player 1’s expected payoff vector is u
1
G2
[hi(j)] = −α‖yi‖+(1/m±(1+ǫ2)/α) ·
u
i
Gm
[j]. The proof is complete by noting that player i’s expected payoff uiGm [j] in Gm is bounded by
m, and by rearranging. 
It’s left to show that preservation of expected payoffs for playing hi(j) and j up to shift and scale
is enough to ensure that (y1/‖y1‖, . . . , ym/‖ym‖) is an ǫm-well-supported Nash equilibrium of Gm.
More precisely, we show that if pure strategy hi(j) is an ǫ2-best response for player 1 in G2, then pure
strategy j is an ǫm-best response for player i in Gm. We can then invoke Claim 4.3 by which player
2 only plays pure strategies that are ǫ2-best responses for player 1, and conclude that mixed strategy
y
i/‖yi‖ contains only ǫm-best responses for player i in Gm.
Assume for contradiction that j is not an ǫm-best response for player i in Gm. Then there exists
another pure strategy j′ ∈ [m] such that uiGm [j] < uiGm [j′] − ǫm. But by Claim 4.6 this implies
u
1
G2
[hi(j)] < u
1
G2
[hi(j
′)] + 2m(1 + ǫ2)/α − ǫm/m. By choice of ǫ2 and α, ǫ2 ≤ ǫm/m − 2m(1 + ǫ2)/α.
Thus, hi(j) cannot be an ǫ2-best response for player 1 in G2, contradiction. This completes the proof
of Lemma 4.2. 
5 A Logarithmic-Sized Linear Multiplication Gadget
In this section we prove Lemma 2.3 by showing an alternative contruction of a linear multiplication
gadget. The main difference from the construction shown in Section 2 is that the unary encoding is
replaced by binary encoding. However, this introduces a new difficulty, since every gadget that performs
binary bit extraction is inherently brittle, i.e., its output is arbitrary for certain inputs. We use the
bit extraction gadget of [DGP09], and overcome the brittleness using standard methods of averaging
(somewhat simplified by introducing a new median gadget).
5.1 Linear Gadgets
We introduce several linear gadgets that will be useful for the construction. Additional gadgets that
are known from previous works can be found in Appendix A. Throughout, we denote the input, output
and auxiliary players of a gadget by P1, . . . , Pm, P,W,W1, . . . ,Wl, and the values they represent by
p1, . . . , pm, p, w,w1, . . . , wl.
The following gadget Gmask treats its first input as a binary mask for its second input (i.e., performs
multiplication between a binary input and an arbitrary input while maintaining linearity). Furthermore,
it guarantees that if the second input is close to zero, the output will be close to zero as well.
Lemma 5.1 (Linear Mask Gadget) There exists a linear gadget Gmask such that in every ǫ-well-
supported Nash equilibrium:
p =


p2 ± ǫ if p1 = 1
0 if p1 = 0
0± 3ǫ if p2 = 0± 2ǫ
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices:
MP,W =
(
1 0
0 1
)
,MW,P =
(
0 1
0 0
)
,MW,P1 =
(
2 0
0 0
)
,MW,P2 =
(
0 0
0 1
)
Expected payoff vectors:
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• uW =MW,PpP +MW,P1pP1 +MW,P2pP2 = (p + 2(1− p1), p2);
• uP =MP,WpW = (1− w,w).
Assume Gmask is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. First we show that p1 is a binary mask for p2.
If p1 = 0, the only ǫ-best response for player W is 0, and so w = 0 and also p = 0 (actually this holds
whenever p1 < 1/2). If p1 = 1, player W ’s expected payoffs for playing strategies 0 and 1 are p and p2
respectively. We claim that p must be equal to p2 up to ±ǫ. Indeed, if p > p2 + ǫ, w = 0 and so p = 0,
contradiction. Similarly, if p < p2 − ǫ, w = 1 and so p = 1, contradiction.
It is left to show that if p2 is close to zero then p is also close to zero. Assume for contradiction that
p2 ≤ 2ǫ and p > 3ǫ. Pure strategy 1 must be an ǫ-best response for P , therefore w ≥ (1 − w) − ǫ. So
pure strategy 1 must be an ǫ-best response for W , therefore p2 ≥ p+ 2(1− p1)− ǫ. Plugging in we get
2ǫ ≥ p2 ≥ p+2(1− p1)− ǫ > 3ǫ+2(1− p1)− ǫ = 2ǫ+ 2− 2p1. This implies that p1 > 1, contradiction.

Lemma 5.2 (Linear Max Gadget) There exists a linear gadget Gmax such that in every ǫ-well-
supported Nash equilibrium, p = max{p1, p2} ± 4ǫ.
Proof: The construction is by combining gadgets:
w1 = G< (p1, p2)
w2 = G− (p2, p1)
w3 = Gmask (w1, w2)
p = G+,∗1 (w3, p1)
The correctness follows almost immediately from the guarantees of the combined gadgets (see Lemma 2.9,
Lemma 5.1, Lemma A.1, Lemma A.2). The idea is to set the output p to be approximately equal to
w1 (p2 − p1) + p1, where w1 is an indicator whether p1 < p2. Assume Gmax is in ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium. If p1 < p2 − ǫ then w1 = 1, and so p is approximately equal to p2. Similarly, if p1 > p2 + ǫ
then w1 = 0, and so p is approximately equal to p1. In the case that |p2 − p1| ≤ ǫ, w1 may receive any
arbitrary value, but w2 ≤ 2ǫ and so by the guarantee of Gmask, w3 ≤ 3ǫ. The product w1 (p2 − p1) is
calculated by Gmask in order to maintain the linearity of the construction. 
Lemma 5.3 (Linear Min Gadget) There exists a linear gadget Gmin such that in every ǫ-well-supported
Nash equilibrium, p = min{p1, p2} ± 8ǫ.
Proof: The construction is by combining gadgets:
w1 = G1−x (p1)
w2 = G1−x (p2)
w3 = Gmax (w1, w2)
p = G1−x (w3)
The correctness follows immediately by the guarantees of the combined gadgets (see Lemma 5.2, Lemma A.3).

Lemma 5.4 (Linear Median Gadget) There exists a linear gadget Gmedian such that in every ǫ-
well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = median{p1, p2, p3} ± 20ǫ.
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Proof: The construction is by combining gadgets:
w1 = Gmax (p1, p2)
w2 = Gmin (p1, p2)
w3 = Gmin (p3, w1)
p = Gmax (w2, w3)
Assume Gmedian is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. We use the following notation to prove cor-
rectness: s = min {p1, p2, p3}, m = median {p1, p2, p3} and l = max {p1, p2, p3}, such that s ≤ m ≤ l.
The values w2 and w3 are equal to two of the three values {p1, p2, p3} = {s,m, l}, up to an error of ±12ǫ
introduced by the maximum and minimum gadgets. To see this, notice that if w1 = pi∈{1,2} ± 4ǫ, then
w2 = pj∈{1,2},j 6=i±4ǫ and w3 = min {p3, pi ± 4ǫ}±8ǫ (by Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3). Now, ifm < l−4ǫ,
both w2 and w3 must be strictly smaller than l, so the two values they are approximately equal to must
be s and m. Taking their maximum therefore results in the median value: max {w2, w3} = m ± 12ǫ,
and so p = m ± (12ǫ+ 4ǫ) (Lemma 5.2). If, however, m ≥ l − 4ǫ, then w2 and w3 are approximately
equal to either {s,m}, {s, l} or {m, l}. Taking the maximum of {w2, w3} therefore results in either
m± (12ǫ+ 4ǫ) or l ± (12ǫ+ 4ǫ) = m± 20ǫ. 
5.2 Brittle Construction
We first construct a brittle multiplication gadget denoted by G˜∗. Let β =
1
2 log(1/ǫ) be a parameter
of the construction (assume for simplicity that β is integral). The output p of G˜∗ is guaranteed to be
p1p2 ± O(
√
ǫ), but only as long as the input p1 is far enough from any integer multiple of 2
−β . For
every 1 ≤ i ≤ β, let Bi, Si,Wi be auxiliary players representing values bi, si, wi respectively. G˜∗ sets
b1, . . . , bβ to be the β most significant bits of input p1 using the bit-extraction gadget Gbit (Lemma A.6).
Then, G˜∗ calculates p2
∑β
i=1
(
bi2
−i
)
, which equals p2
(
p1 ± 2−β
)
. The calculations are carried out in
the following order:
• The values {p22−i}i∈[β] are calculated using the scaling gadget G∗ζ (Lemma A.5), i.e., si =
G∗2−i(p2).
• For every i ∈ [β], p22−i is multiplied by the extracted bit bi using the mask gadget Gmask
(Lemma 5.1), i.e., wi = Gmask(bi, si).
• The values {p22−ibi}i∈[β] are summed up using the summation gadget G+ = G+,∗1 (Lemma 2.9),
i.e., p = G+(w1, . . . , wβ).
5.3 Correctness of Brittle Construction
Lemma 5.5 Let p1, p2 be the input values of G˜∗. If p1 is 3βǫ-far from every integer multiple of 2
−β,
then in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ ≤ 1
103
, the output value p equals p1p2 ± 2
√
ǫ.
The size of G˜∗ is O(β).
Proof: First observe that since β = 12 log(1/ǫ) (i.e., 2
−β =
√
ǫ) and ǫ ≤ 1
103
, it holds that 2 · 3βǫ < 2−β ,
and so p1 can indeed be 3βǫ-far from any integer multiple of 2
−β . We write p1 as p1 =
∑β
i=1 b
∗
i 2
−i + δ,
where 3βǫ < δ < 2−β − 3βǫ. Assume G˜∗ is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ ≤ 1103 . By
Lemma 5.1, Lemma A.6 and Lemma A.5, we know that for every i ∈ [β]:
bi = b
∗
i
si = p22
−i ± ǫ
wi = sibi ± ǫ = p22−ib∗i ± 2ǫ
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By Lemma 2.9 and the value of δ:
p = min
{
1,
β∑
i=1
wi
}
± ǫ
= min
{
1,
β∑
i=1
(
p22
−ib∗i ± 2ǫ
)}± ǫ
= min
{
1, p2
β∑
i=1
(
2−ib∗i
)± 2βǫ
}
± ǫ
= min {1, p2 (p1 − δ) ± 2βǫ} ± ǫ
= p1p2 ±
(
2−β + 3βǫ
)
Plugging in β = 12 log(1/ǫ), we get that p = p1p2 ± 2
√
ǫ, as required. Size of G˜∗: The bit-extraction
gadget Gbit requires O(β) vertices (Lemma A.6), and the number of auxiliary vertices {Si} and {Wi}
is also O(β). The other gadgets are of constant size. 
5.4 Robust Construction
When p1 is close to a multiple of 2
−β , G˜∗’s output may be arbitrary. To circumvent this issue, the
ultimate multiplication gadget G∗ applies G˜∗ three times, each time with a slightly perturbed copy of
the input p1. The perturbation guarantees that at most one of the three copies of p1 is close to an integer
multiple of 2−β , so that at least two of G˜∗’s three outputs are approximately correct. The difficulty
is that we don’t know which of the three outputs is approximately correct and which is arbitrary. We
overcome this difficulty by taking the median of the three outputs as the final result, which is now
guaranteed to be approximately equal to the required output p1p2.
The inputs to G˜∗ are set to be (up to ±O(ǫ)): (p˜1, p2), (p˜1 − ∆, p2) and (p˜1 − 2∆, p2), where p˜1 =
max{p1, 2∆} and ∆ = 7βǫ. This is achieved by combining the following gadgets:
• First, the value of p˜1 is set: c1 = G:=(2∆ + 7ǫ), p˜1 = Gmax(p1, c1).
• Then, two additional inputs are prepared: c2 = G:=(∆), c3 = G:=(2∆), d1 = G−(p˜1, c2), d2 =
G−(p˜1, c3).
• G˜∗ is applied: w1 = G˜∗(p˜1, p2), w2 = G˜∗(d1, p2), w3 = G˜∗(d2, p2).
• The median is found: p = Gmedian(w1, w2, w3).
5.5 Correctness of Robust Construction
Proof of Lemma 2.3 (Logarithmic-Sized Construction): First note that G∗ is a combination of
linear gadgets and is thus itself linear. The size of G∗ is O(β) = O(log
1
ǫ ), since the brittle multiplication
gadget G˜∗ requires O(β) vertices (Lemma 5.5), and the number of other auxiliary vertices is constant.
Assume G∗ is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ ≤ 1105 . By the gadget guarantees we know
that p˜1 ≥ 2∆ + 2ǫ, and that d1 = p˜1 − ∆ ± 2ǫ and d2 = p˜1 − 2∆ ± 2ǫ (Lemma 5.2, Lemma A.2 and
Lemma A.4). Since ǫ < 1105 ,∆ = 7βǫ and β =
1
2 log
1
ǫ , it can easily be verified that p˜1 > d1 > d2 ≥ 0
and that the distance between each consecutive pair is ∆± 4ǫ.
Claim 5.6 At most one of p˜1, d1, d2 can be 3βǫ-close to a multiple of 2
−β .
Proof: Since the distance ∆±4ǫ is larger than 2·3βǫ, if one of p˜1, d1, d2 is 3βǫ-close to a certain multiple
k2−β , then the other two must be 3βǫ-far from k2−β . Furthermore, since the distance is smaller than
16
(2−β − 2 · 3βǫ)/2, the other two must be 3βǫ-far from the nearby multiples (k − 1) 2−β and (k + 1) 2−β
as well. 
By Lemma 5.5 and Claim 5.6, at most one of w1, w2, w3 can be arbitrary. There are two cases:
• The median is not the arbitrary value. Assume without loss of generality that the median is w3
(since it is the furthest from p˜1p2). By Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5:
p = w3 ± 20ǫ
= d2p2 ±
(
2
√
ǫ+ 20ǫ
)
= p˜1p2 ±
(
2
√
ǫ+ 2∆ + 22ǫ
)
• The median is the arbitrary value. Assume without loss of generality that the non-arbitrary values
are w2 and w3 (the furthest from p˜1p2). The median is between these values, so we may assume
without loss of generality that it is equal to w3, and proceed as in the previous case.
We have seen that in both cases, p is close to p˜1p2. It is now left to verify that p˜1 is close to p1.
Claim 5.7 p˜1 = p1 ± (2∆ + 11ǫ).
Proof: If max {p1, c1} = p1 then p˜1 = p1 ± 4ǫ (Lemma 5.2). Otherwise, 0 ≤ p1 ≤ c1 = 2∆ + 6ǫ ± ǫ
(Lemma A.4) and p˜1 = c1 ± 4ǫ. 
We conclude that p = p1p2 ± (2
√
ǫ+ 4∆ + 37ǫ) = p1p2 ± 3
√
ǫ, as required. 
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A Standard Gadgets
The following gadgets are constructed by Daskalakis et al. [DGP09]. We denote the input and output
players by P1, P2, P , and the values they represent by p1, p2, p.
Proof of Lemma 2.8 (Linear AND Gadget):
Nonzero payoff matrices:
MP,P1 =MP,P2 =
(
3
16
3
16
0 12
)
Expected payoff vectors:
• uP =MP,P1p1 +MP,P2p2 = (3/4, (p1 + p2)/2).
Assume G>ζ is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ < 1/4. If p1 = p2 = 1, the only ǫ-best
response for player P is pure strategy 1, so p = 1. Similarly, if (p1 = 0) ∨ (p2 = 0) then p = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2.9 (Linear Scaled-Summation Gadget):
Let P1, . . . , Pm, P,W be the input players, output player and auxiliary player of G+,∗ζ respectively,
representing values p1, . . . , pm, p, w. Nonzero payoff matrices:
MW,P =
(
0 1
0 0
)
,MW,Pi =
(
0 0
0 ζ
)
,MP,W =
(
1 0
0 1
)
Expected payoff vectors:
• uW =MW,PpP +∑i∈[m]MW,PipPi = (p, ζ∑i∈[m] pi);
• uP =MP,WpW = (1− w,w).
Assume G+,∗ζ is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. If player W plays full support (0 < w < 1),
then both of W ’s pure strategies 0 and 1 must be ǫ-best responses, and so p = uW [0] = uW [1] ± ǫ =
ζ
∑
i∈[m] pi± ǫ, as required. If w = 0, the only ǫ-best response for player P is pure strategy 0, so p = 0.
Similarly, if w = 1 then p = 1. Case analysis:
• ǫ < ζ∑i∈[m] pi < 1 − ǫ: Assume for contradiction that W does not play full support. Without
loss of generality, assume w = 1. But then p = 1 and uW [0] = 1 > ζ
∑
i∈[m] pi + ǫ = u
W [1] + ǫ,
contradiction. Similarly, w = 0 leads to contradiction.
• ζ∑i∈[m] pi ≤ ǫ: Player W can either play full support or pure strategy 0 (if w = 1 then p = 1
and the only ǫ-best response for W is pure strategy 0, contradiction). If w = 0 then p = 0 =
ζ
∑
i∈[m] pi ± ǫ, as required.
• ζ∑i∈[m] pi ≥ 1− ǫ: Similarly to the previous case, W can either play full support or pure strategy
1, and if w = 1 then p = 1 = min{1, ζ∑i∈[m] pi} ± ǫ, as required.

Lemma A.1 (Linear Comparison Gadget) There exists a linear comparison gadget G< of size
O(1), such that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = 1 if p1 < p2− ǫ and p = 0 if p1 > p2+ ǫ.
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices:
MP,P1 =
(
0 1
0 0
)
,MP,P2 =
(
0 0
0 1
)
Expected payoff vectors:
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• uP =MP,P1p1 +MP,P2p2 = (p1, p2).
Assume G< is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. If p1 < p2 − ǫ, the only ǫ-best response for player
P is pure strategy 1, so p = 1. Similarly, if p1 > p2 + ǫ then p = 0. 
Lemma A.2 (Linear Minus Gadget) There exists a linear subtraction gadget G− of size O(1), such
that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = max {0, p2 − p1} ± ǫ.
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices:
MW,P =
(
0 1
0 0
)
,MW,P1 =
(
0 0
0 −1
)
,MW,P2 =
(
0 0
0 1
)
,MP,W =
(
1 0
0 1
)
Expected payoff vectors:
• uW =MW,PpP +MW,P1p1 +MW,P2p2 = (p, p2 − p1);
• uP =MP,WpW = (1− w,w).
Assume G− is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. As in the proof of Lemma 2.9, it is not hard to
show that either player W plays full support (so both of W ’s pure strategies must be ǫ-best responses
and p = p2 − p1 ± ǫ), or one of the following happens:
• p2 − p1 > 1− ǫ: Player W can play pure strategy 1, and then p = 1 = p2 − p1 ± ǫ, as required.
• p2−p1 < ǫ: Player W can play pure strategy 0, and then p = 0 = max{0, p2−p1}± ǫ, as required.

Lemma A.3 (Linear Complementary Gadget) There exists a linear complementary gadget G1−x
of size O(1), such that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = 1− p1 ± ǫ.
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices:
MW,P =
(
0 1
0 0
)
,MW,P1 =
(
0 0
1 0
)
,MP,W =
(
1 0
0 1
)
Expected payoff vectors:
• uW =MW,PpP +MW,P1p1 = (p, 1− p1);
• uP =MP,WpW = (1− w,w).
Assume G1−x is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. As in the proof of Lemma 2.9, it is not hard to
show that either player W plays full support (so both of W ’s pure strategies must be ǫ-best responses
and p = 1− p1 ± ǫ), or one of the following happens:
• 1− p1 > 1− ǫ: Player W can play pure strategy 1, and then p = 1 = 1− p1 ± ǫ, as required.
• 1− p1 < ǫ: Player W can play pure strategy 0, and then p = 0 = 1− p1 ± ǫ, as required.

Lemma A.4 (Linear Assignment Gadget) For every rational ζ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a linear as-
signment gadget G:=ζ of size O(1), such that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = ζ ± ǫ.
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices:
MW,P =
(
0 1
ζ ζ
)
,MP,W =
(
1 0
0 1
)
Expected payoff vectors:
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• uW =MW,PpP = (p, ζ);
• uP =MP,WpW = (1− w,w).
Proof of correctness as in Lemma A.3. 
Lemma A.5 (Linear Scaling Gadget) For every rational ζ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a linear scaling
gadget G∗ζ of size O(1), such that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = ζp1 ± ǫ.
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices:
MW,P =
(
0 1
0 0
)
,MW,P1 =
(
0 0
0 ζ
)
,MP,W =
(
1 0
0 1
)
Expected payoff vectors:
• uW =MW,PpP +MW,P1p1 = (p, ζp1);
• uP =MP,WpW = (1− w,w).
Proof of correctness as in Lemma A.3. 
The following gadget has multiple output players, denoted by B1, . . . , Bβ and representing values
b1, . . . , bβ . It extracts the first β bits of its input, provided the distance of p1 from any multiple of
2−β is at least 3βǫ.
Lemma A.6 (Linear Bit Extraction Gadget) For every integer β > 0, there exists a linear bit
extraction gadget Gbit of size O(β), such that given input p1 =
∑
i∈[β] b
∗
i 2
−i + δ where 3βǫ < δ <
2−β − 3βǫ, in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ = O (2−(β+logβ)), bi = b∗i for every
i ∈ [β].
Proof: The construction is by combining linear gadgets:
x1 = G:= (p1)
∀i : bi = G>2−i (xi)
∀i : wi = G∗2−i (bi)
∀i : xi+1 = G− (xi, w)
The correctness follows from the guarantees of the combined gadgets, and by induction on i. See
[DGP09, Lemma 19] for details. 
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